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1. Introduction    
In the RFID security domain, various issues are related to data protection of tags, message 
interception over the air channel, and eavesdropping within the interrogation zone of the 
RFID reader (Sarma. et al., 2003; EPCglobal). This topic has been so far been dominated by 
the topics of data protection associated with data privacy and authentication between tag 
and reader. In this paper, when using RFID, two aspects on the risks imposed on the passive 
party are discussed.  
Firstly, the data privacy problem is such that storing person-specific data in a RFID system 
can threaten the privacy of the passive party. This party may be, for example, a customer or 
an employee of the operator. The passive party uses tags or items that have been identified 
as tags, but the party has no control over the data stored on the tags.  
Secondly, authentication is carried out when the identity of a person or program is verified. 
Then, on this basis, authorization takes place, i.e. rights, such as the right of access to data. 
In the case of RFID systems, it is particularly important for tags to be authenticated by the 
reader and vice-versa. In addition, readers must also authenticate themselves to the 
backend, but in this case, there are no RFID-specific security problems. 
To satisfy the above requirements, security protocols play an essential role. As with any 
protocol, the security protocol comprises a prescribed sequence of interactions between 
entities, and is designed to achieve a certain end. A diplomatic protocol typically involves a 
memorandum of understanding exchange, intended to establish agreement between parties 
with potentially conflicting interests. Security protocols are, in fact, excellent candidates for 
rigorous analysis techniques: they are critical components of distributed security 
architecture, very easy to express, however, extremely difficult to evaluate by hand. They 
are deceptively simple: literature is full of protocols that appear to be secure but have 
subsequently been found to fall prey to a subtle attack, sometimes years later. 
Cryptographic primitives are used as building blocks to achieve security goals such as 
confidentiality and integrity authentication. 
Formal methods play a very critical role in examining whether a security protocol is 
ambiguous, incorrect, inconsistent or incomplete. Hence, the importance of applying formal 
methods, particularly for safety critical systems, cannot be overemphasized. There are two 
main approaches in formal methods, logic based methodology (Burrows et al., 1989; Hoare, 
1985), and tool based methodology (Lowe, 1997; FDR, 1999). In this paper, the hash (Sarma. 
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et al., 2003) based RFID authentication protocols which employs hash functions to secure 
RFID communication are specified and verified whether this protocol satisfies security 
properties such as secrecy and authentication using GNY(Gong L., Needham R., and 
Yahalom R.; Gong et al., 1990) logic as the Modal logic (Burrows et al., 1989) methodology. 
After verifying the protocols as GNY logic, the existence of known security flaws in the 
protocols is confirmed, and the problems of the hash based technique are described. The 
contribution of this paper is designing and verifying the secure authentication protocol, 
which is widely researched in RFID systems using formal methods. This paper is organized 
as follows. In brief, Section 2 describes related work on RFID security and authentication 
schemes associated with hash functions. In Section 3, the use of modal logic (GNY) is 
outlined for analyzing security protocols. Section 4 describes the analyzed result of the 
protocol. Section 5 presents the proposed security scheme. Section 6 addresses conclusions 
and future work. 
2. Related work 
There has been much literature attempting to address the security concerns raised by the use 
of RFID tags. 
2.1 The hash lock scheme 
A reader defines a “Lock” value by computing lock = hash (key)(Weis et al., 2003), where 
the key is a random value. This lock value is sent to a tag and the tag stores this value in its 
reserved memory (i.e. a metaID value), the tag then enters into a locked state automatically. 
To unlock the tag, the reader transmits the original key value to the tag, and the tag 
performs a hash function on that key to obtain the metaID value. The tag then has to 
compare the metaID with its current metaID value. If both values match, the tag is unlocked. 
Once the tag is in an unlocked state, it can transmit its identification number, such as the 
Electronic Product Code (EPC) to readers' queries in the forthcoming cycles. This approach 
is simple and straightforward in achieving data protection, i.e. the EPC code stored in the 
tag is being protected. An authorized reader is able to unlock and read the tag, then lock the 
tag again after reading the code. This scheme is analyzed in Section 4 in detail. 
2.2 The randomized hash lock scheme 
This is an extension of hash lock (Weis et al., 2003) based on pseudo random functions 
(PRFs). An additional pseudo-random number generator is required to be embedded into 
tags for this approach. Presently, tags respond to reader queries using a pair of values (r, 
hash(IDk || r)), where r is the random number generated by a tag, IDk is the ID of the k-th 
tag among a number of tags in ID1, ID2, . . ., IDk, . . ., IDn. For reader queries, the tag returns 
two values. The first is the random number. The second is a computed hash value based on 
concatenation(||) of its IDk and r. When the reader obtains these two values, it retrieves the 
current N number of ID (i.e. ID1, ID2, . . ., IDn) from the backend database. The reader will 
perform the above hash function on each ID from 1 to n, with r, until it finds a match. When 
the reader finds a match, the reader is able to identify the tag k is on its tag's ID list (i.e. tag 
authentication). The reader will then transmit the IDk value to the tag for unlocking. Once 
the tag is in an unlocked state, the reader can obtain its EPC code in the subsequent reading 
cycle. 
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In addition to achieving RFID tag security, this scheme also provides location privacy. In the 
hash lock scheme, tags still disclose metaID values. However, this approach only discloses r 
and the hashed value.  
2.3 The chained hash scheme 
Ohkubo et al.(Okubo et al.; Okubo et al., 2004) suggested the chained hash procedure as a 
cryptographically robust alternative. In every activation, the tag calculates a new meta ID, 
using two different hash functions. First, the current meta ID is hashed in order to generate 
a new meta ID, which is then hashed again with the aid of the second function. It is this 
second meta ID that is transmitted to the reader. For the purpose of decoding, the reader 
must hash until a match with the meta ID transmitted from the tag has been found. The 
advantage of this procedure is that it is not sensitive to repeated attempts to eavesdrop the 
meta ID during transmission via air waves.  
2.4 Other approaches 
Another hash-based approach is Hash based Varying Identifier proposed by Henrici and 
Müller (Henri & Müller, 2004). Their scheme also adopts a hash function and a random 
number generator (RNG), but a pseudo random number is generated by a back-end server 
and transmitted to the tag every interrogation, to make the tag’s queried identifier random 
and preserve location privacy.  
Hwang et al. (Hwang et al., 2004) proposed an improved authentication protocol of Hash 
based Varying Identifier. In their scheme, the main difference is that a reader has a random 
number generator to protect against a man-in-the-middle attack. 
3. Formal methods for security protocols 
3.1 Modal logic: GNY(Gong L., Needham R., and  Yahalom R.) 
GNY(Gong et al., 1990) logic is used to reason about security protocols. GNY logic is a direct 
successor to BAN (Burrows et al., 1989) logic and is quite powerful in its ability to uncover 
even subtle protocol flaws. Discussion of the virtues and limitations of the logic can be 
found in (Mathuria et al., 1994). 
In GNY logic, message extensions are added to the protocol description during protocol 
formalization, so that principals can communicate their beliefs and thus reason about each 
other’s beliefs. The use of message extensions enables the logic to deal with different levels 
of trust among protocol principals. As such, it is considered an improvement over BAN 
logic, which assumes that all principals are honest and competent. This development is 
noteworthy as many protocol attacks are performed by dishonest principals. As an example 
of a message extension, consider the following: P → Q: {K; P}Ks- is formally stated as Q ◁ 
*{*K, P}Ks- ~> S |≡ P  K   Q. This means that principal Q is informed of a session key, K, and 
an identity, P, encrypted under the private key of principal S. The session key, K, is marked 
with a not-originated-here asterisk. Q is informed that S believes K is a suitable shared secret 
for P and Q. 
The postulates of GNY logic are used to deduce whether protocol goals can be derived from 
the initial assumptions and protocol steps. If such a derivation exists, the protocol is 
successfully verified.  
Logic-based formal verification involves the following steps: 
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1. Formalization of the protocol messages; 
2. Specification of the initial assumptions; 
3. Specification of the protocol goals; 
4. Application of the logical postulates. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The process of verification with modal logic 
The first step in logic-based verification involves specifying the protocol in the language of 
the logic by expressing each protocol message as a logical formula. This step is known as 
protocol formalization (some authors also refer to it as idealization). A formal description of 
the protocol, obtained by formalization, does not simply list the components of each 
message but attempts to show the purpose of these components so as to avoid ambiguity. 
The second step in the verification process involves formally specifying the initial protocol 
assumptions. These assumptions reflect the beliefs and possessions of the involved 
principals at the beginning of each protocol run. 
In the third step, the desired protocol goals are expressed in the language of the logic. These 
goals are specified in terms of the beliefs and possessions of the protocol participants at the 
end of a successful protocol run. 
The final verification step concerns the application of logical postulates to establish the 
beliefs and possessions of protocol principals. The objective of the logical analysis is to 
verify whether the desired goals of the protocol can be derived from the initial assumptions 
and protocol steps. If such a derivation exists, the protocol is successfully verified; 
otherwise, verification fails. A successfully verified protocol can be considered secure within 
the scope of the logic. On the other hand, even the results of failed verification are helpful, 
as these may point to missing assumptions or weaknesses in the protocol. If a weakness is 
discovered, the protocol should be redesigned and re-verified. However, verification logic 
techniques have their limitations, not least of which is the likelihood of errors in protocol 
formalization. The number of opportunities to make such mistakes increases as the 
verification process becomes more complicated, requiring a thorough understanding of the 
logic used. During the verification process, the semantics of the protocol must be 
interpreted, in order to specify the meaning that a protocol message is intended to convey. 
This ‘interpretation process’ is somewhat controversial––different authors may interpret the 
same messages differently. If the formalized protocol does not properly represent the 
original design, then the proof demonstrates only that the protocol corresponding to this 
formal description is secure. However, no claims can be made on the security of the original 
design. Lack of clarity about protocol goals and initial assumptions is a further cause for 
concern. 
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In some cases the same protocol may be used for slightly different purposes. For example if 
a protocol is used to generate a new session key, each principal involved in the protocol run 
may require that the other principal believes the session key to be a shared secret. This 
property is known as second level belief. If a protocol is verified as secure for first level 
belief only and used in an application where second level belief is required, serious security 
breaches are likely. Hence, it is vital to note the assumptions and goals under which a 
security protocol is considered secure during its formal verification. 
Despite these criticisms, different logic techniques have identified numerous protocol 
weaknesses and are considered as successful. Gligor et al. (Gligor et al., 1991) summarize the 
virtues of authentication logic as follows: 
• They help formalize reasoning about useful abstract properties of cryptographic 
protocols. 
• They force designers to make explicit security  assumptions. 
• They achieve a reasonably well-defined set of authentication goals. 
4. The RFID authentication protocol and its verification 
Firstly, the behavior of the hash unlocking protocols is modeled as hash unlocking of the 
hash lock scheme. The simple description of the hash locking is already described in Section 
2.1 and the role of the reader simply writes the metaID as a keyed hash value in the tag. The 
general overview of the authentication protocol (Fig.2) is as follows; 
 
T RF tag’s identity 
R RF reader’s identity 
DB Back-end server’s identity that has a database 
Xkey Session key generated randomly from X 
metaID Key generated from reader using hash function 
ID Information value of tag 
Xn A random nonce generated by X 
H Hash function 
E key (M) Encrypted message with key 
Table 1. Hash lock scheme notation 
     Message 1. :  R    ->  T    : Query 
       Message 2. :  T    ->  R    : metaID 
       Message 3. :  R    ->  DB : metaID 
          Message 4. :  DB ->  R    : Rkey, ID 
    Message 5. :  R    ->  T    : Rkey 
Message 6. :  T    ->  R    : ID 
Fig. 2. The overview of the hash unlocking protocol 
- Message 1: Request by the reader. 
- Message 2: The tag transmits the metaID(locked  value as hashed key) to the reader. 
- Message 3: The reader forwards the metaID to the  Database. 
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- Message 4: The database transmits the original key value and tag ID to the reader after 
checking the match between metaID from the reader and metaID in the database. 
- Message 5: The reader transmits original key to the tag to ensure tag authentication. 
- Message 6: The tag transmits its information value to the reader. 
 
(X,Y) 
{X}K, 
{X}K- 
#(X) 
φ (X) 
P◁ X 
 
P◁*(X) 
P ∋ X 
P |~ X 
P |≡ X 
 
X ~> C 
 
P |⇒ X 
 
P    K    Q 
Concatenation of two formulae 
Symmetric encryption and decryption 
The formula X is fresh. X has not been sent in a  message at  any time before 
the current run of the protocol 
Formula X is recognizable 
P has a received a message containing X and P can read and repeat X, 
possibly after performing some decryption 
P is told formula X which he did not convey previously during the current 
protocol run 
P possesses or is capable of possessing formula X 
P conveyed X 
P believes X. That is, the principal P acts as if X is true 
Formula X has the extension C. The precondition for X being conveyed is 
represented by statement C  
P has jurisdiction over X. The principal P is an authority on X and should be 
trusted on this matter. This construct is used when a principal has delegated 
authority over some statement 
K is a suitable secret for P and Q. They may use it as a key to communicate 
or as a proof of identity 
Table 2. Notation of GNY logic  
4.1 Formalization of the protocol step 
 
 
Fig. 3. Formalization of the protocol step 
A formalized version of the protocol is shown in Fig.3 (from table 2). The asterisks denote 
the ability of each principal to recognize that it did not transmit the received message at an 
earlier stage in the protocol.  
In M1, the reader is told the metaID (locked value as hashed key) from the tag and the 
message extension in the first message indicates that if a reader transmits a H(RKey) to lock 
a tag, then the tag believes that RKey contained in that metaID belongs to the reader. In M2, 
M 1.    R◁ *metaID ~> R |≡ H(RKey)  T,  
                                       T |≡ R |~ H(RKey)  
M 2. DB◁ *metaID  
M 3.    R◁ RKey, *ID ~> R |≡ RKey  DB, 
                                          R |≡ ID    DB 
M 4.    T◁ RKey 
M 5.    R◁ ID 
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the DB is told the metaID from the reader and it means the metaID is forwarded from the 
reader to DB. In M3, the reader is told the original key value and tag ID from the database to 
the reader after checking the match between metaID from the reader and metaID in the 
database and the message extension in the third message indicates that if the reader receives 
RKey and ID from some principal, then the reader believes that RKey contained in that 
metaID belongs to the DB. In M4, the tag is told the original key from the reader and in M5, 
the reader is told the tag ID from the tag. 
4.2 Specification of the initial assumptions 
The initial assumptions for the hash unlocking protocol are as follows: 
 
The first two rows state the possessions of both principals. Each principal possesses its 
information, its symmetric key and its identification data. The next row states the 
recognizability assumptions. Reader recognizes his symmetric key and other’s identification 
data. The final two rows concern beliefs regarding the database server. Tag believes that 
RKey is the symmetric key between DB and Reader, ID is a secret value for DB and Tag, that 
DB is honest and competent, and that DB has jurisdiction over the other principal’s 
symmetric key. 
4.3 Specification of the protocol goal 
The goals of the hash unlocking protocol are as follows: 
 
The goals in the first row state that both principals believe it to be fresh. The next row 
concerns authentication: each principal should believe that its counterpart conveyed the 
respective identification data. The goal on the remaining row describes the confidentiality of 
the information. 
4.4 Application of the logical postulates (from Appendix) 
M 1.  R◁ *metaID ~> R |≡ H(RKey)  T, T |≡ R |~ H(RKey)       
• Applying T1 to M 1 yields R◁ metaID. R is told T’s metaID without not-originated-here 
asterisk. 
• Applying P1 yields R ∋ metaID. The reader possesses the metaID value of the tag. 
• Since R recognizes RKey, by R1 R |≡ φ (H(RKey)). R recognizes the H(RKey). 
• However, R cannot believe that metaID is the valid current value of the tag. The 
preconditions of J2 are not achieved and the freshness of H(RKey) is not satisfied. An 
intruder could use an old compromised hash value belonging to the tag in order to 
masquerade as the reader. 
R |≡ #H(RKey); T |≡ #H(RKey);  
T |≡ R |~ RKey; R |≡ T |~ ID; 
R ∋ ID
T ∋ metaID ; T ∋ RKey ; T ∋ ID; 
DB ∋ RKey ; DB ∋ ID ; 
R |≡ φ(RKey); R |≡ φ (ID);  
T |≡  RKey  DB; T |≡  ID  DB; 
T |≡ DB |⇒ DB |≡ *; R |≡ DB |⇒ DB |≡ *;  
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M 2. DB◁ *metaID  
• Applying T1 to M 2 yields DB◁ metaID.  DB is told T’s metaID without not-originated-
here asterisk. 
• Applying P1 yields DB ∋ metaID. The database possesses the metaID value of the tag. 
• However, R still cannot believe that metaID is the valid current value of the tag. The 
preconditions of J2 are not achieved as in M 1. An intruder still could use an old 
compromised hash value belonging to the tag in order to masquerade as the reader. 
M 3.  R◁ RKey, *ID ~> R |≡ RKey DB,R |≡ ID  DB 
• Applying T1 and P1 yields R ∋ (RKey, ID). The reader possesses the (RKey, ID). By T2, R 
∋ RKey, R ∋ ID. 
• However, R cannot believe that RKey is the valid current value from the tag’s metaID. 
Since the freshness of RKey is not satisfied, the reader cannot transmit RKey to the tag. 
M 4.  T◁ RKey 
M 5.  R◁ ID 
• Applying T1 and P1 to M4 and M5 yields T ∋ RKey, R ∋ ID. 
• However, by I4, J2, the tag cannot believe that the reader transmits RKey to the tag. The 
reader cannot believe that the tag transmits the ID to the reader. 
4.5 Weakness in the Hash unlocking protocol 
The above verification of the hash unlocking protocol identifies the following failed goals: 
1. R cannot derive that the H(RKey) is fresh; 
2. T cannot derive that the H(RKey) is fresh; 
3. T cannot derive that R conveyed RKey ; 
4. R cannot derive that T conveyed ID; 
5. R cannot derive that ID is valid; 
5. The proposed the strong authentication protocol for RFID systems 
5.1 Analysis of the strong authentication protocol using GNY logic 
In the previous schemes (Weis et al., 2003; Ohkubo et al. 2004; Henrici & Muller, 2004; 
Hwang et al., 2004), it is assumed that database is a TTP (Trusted Third Party) and the 
communication channel between reader and database is secure. However, this paper 
assumes that database is not a TTP and the communication channel is as insecure as current 
wireless networks. It is also assumed that k is the secret session key shared between reader 
and database, and reader and database have enough capability to manage the symmetric-
key crypto-system and sufficient computational power for encryption and decryption.  
To satisfy security requirements, the most effective protective measure against an attack 
involving eavesdropping at the air interface is not to store any contents on the tag itself and 
instead to read only the ID of the tag that database has transmitted to be scanned from 
reader. This measure, which is most often recommended in the technical literature and 
which is assumed by EPC global, offers the additional advantages that less expensive tags 
can be used, the memory for the associated data in the database is practically unlimited. The 
main idea of this framework is based on the security algorithm employed in the Yahalom 
protocol(Paulson, 2001). 
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The proposed protocol must guarantee the secrecy of the session key: in message 4, 5, the 
value of the session key must be known only by participants playing the roles of T and R. R 
and T also must be properly authenticated to the DB. 
 
                                         Message 1. R    -> T   : Query   
                                         Message 2. T    -> R   : Tn   
                                         Message 3. R    -> DB: E ServerKey(R) ( T, Tn, Rn )  
                                         Message 4. DB -> T   : E ServerKey(T) ( R, DBkey, Tn, Rn, ID) 
                                         Message 5. DB -> R   : E ServerKey(R) ( T, DBkey ) 
                                         Message 6. T    -> R   : E DBkey ( ID ) 
 
Fig. 4. Overview of the proposed strong authentication protocol 
The main idea of the proposed protocol is that the ServerKey and Tag's Nonce(Tn) is used to 
minimize the burden of the Tag and to ensure authentication between Tag and Reader. The 
definition of a function called ServerKey that takes in the name of a Server and returns a 
ServerKey could be regarded as shared: Agent -> ServerKey. If reader would like to 
transmit any messages to database, then he would use the ServerKey with his identity as 
parameter. This description resembles a functional programming language.  
The general description of the proposed protocol is described as follows; 
- Message 1: Query request by the reader 
- Message 2: T is defined to take a random nonce Tn and transmit R. This makes simple 
challenge-response easy.  
- Message 3: Through T, Tn, and Reader's Nonce (Rn) with Server Key, R can ensure 
database authentication. 
- Message 4: DB encrypts all of the R, DBkey, Tn, Rn, and ID received from R and 
transmits these to T to allow R to authenticate securely using the server key.  
- Message 5: DB also transmits T, DBkey to R to decrypt Tag's ID.  
- Message 6: T can transmit ID securely using the DBkey received in Message 4. 
In addition, message 4,5 mean the protocol step that can be transmitted from database to 
other participants simultaneously to decrypt the tag’s ID in message 6.  
5.1.1 Formalization of the protocol steps 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. The formalization of the protocol step 
A formalized version of the protocol is shown in Fig. 5. The asterisks denote the ability of 
each principal to recognize that it did not transmit the received message at an earlier stage 
in the protocol. The protocol step in message 1 (Fig.4.) was omitted in Fig 5. 
M 1.  R  ◁ *Tn 
M 2. DB◁ *{T, Tn, Rn}K(R) 
M 3.  T  ◁ {*R, *DBKey, Tn, *Rn, *Id}K(T) 
M 4.  R  ◁ {T, *DBKey}K(R) 
M 5.  R  ◁ {*Id}DBKey 
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T ∋ Tn; T ∋ K(T); R ∋ Rn; R ∋ K(R); 
DB ∋ Id; DB ∋ DBKey; DB ∋ K(T); DB ∋ K(R); 
T |≡ φ (Id); T |≡ φ (T, DBKey);  
R |≡ φ (Id); R |≡ φ (DBKey);   
T |≡ #Tn; R |≡ #Rn; DB |≡ #DBKey; 
T |≡ DBKey DB; T |≡ K(T) DB; T |≡(DB|⇒ DBKey R); 
R |≡ DBKey DB; R |≡ K(R) DB; R |≡(DB|⇒ DBKeyT); 
5.1.2  Specification of the initial assumption 
The initial assumptions for the proposed protocol are as follows; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first two rows mean that each principal possesses its random nonce, symmetric key and 
information data. The next two rows state that the tag and reader recognize the other’s 
symmetric key and information data. The next row means that each principal believes its 
nonce or key freshness. The final two rows concern beliefs regarding the database server 
that DB has jurisdiction over its own key and the other principal’s symmetric key. 
5.1.3 Specification of the protocol goal 
The goals of the proposed protocol are as follows; 
 
 
The first three rows concern authentication: each principal should believe that its 
counterpart is conveyed in the respective identification data. The goals in the fourth row 
describe key agreement: both principals should possess the shared key through a challenge-
response process. The goal on the remaining row describes the confidentiality of the 
information. 
5.1.4 Application of the logical postulates(from Appendix) 
M 1.  R◁ *Tn 
• Applying T1 and P1 yields R ∋ Tn. The reader possesses the T’s random nonce. 
M 2. DB◁ *{T, Tn, Rn}K(R) 
• Applying T1 and T3 yields DB◁ T, Tn, and Rn, by T2 and P1 DB ∋ T, DB ∋ Tn, DB ∋ Rn. 
• Applying F1 yields DB |≡ #{T, Tn, Rn}K(R) and satisfies the goal at the first row in 
Section 5.1.3. 
M 3.  T◁ {*R, *DBKey, Tn, *Rn, *ID}K(T) 
• Applying T3 yields T◁ (*R, *DBKey, Tn, *Rn, *ID).  
• Applying T2 and T1, P1 yields T ∋ DBKey, T ∋ Tn, T ∋ Rn, and T ∋ ID. 
• Applying F1 yields T |≡ #{R, DBKey, Tn, Rn, ID}K(T) and satisfies the goal at the second 
row. 
DB |≡ #{T, Tn,Rn}K(R); 
T |≡ #{R, DBKey, Tn, Rn, Id}K(T);  
R |≡ DB |~ {DBKey}K(R); R |≡ T |~ {ID}DBKey; 
T |≡ T  DBKEY  R; R |≡ T  DBKEY  R; 
R ∋ Id 
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M 4.  R◁ {T, *DBKey}K(R) 
• Applying T3 yields R◁ {T, *DBKey}. 
• Applying T2, T1 and P1 yields R ∋ DBKey. 
• Applying I4 yields R |≡ DB |~ {DBKey}K(R) and satisfies the first goal at the third row. 
• Applying R ∋ DBKey and I4, yields R |≡ T |~ {ID}DBKey and  satisfies the second goal at 
the third row. 
M 5.  R◁ {*ID}DBKey 
• Applying T3 and P1 yields R ∋ ID and satisfies the goal at the last row. 
Through T ∋ DBKey in M3. and R ∋ DBKey in M4., the goals(T |≡ T  DBKEY  R; R |≡ T  DBKEY  R;) 
at the fourth row.  
 
Lists Hash Lock 
Randomized 
Hash 
Chained 
Hash 
Proposed 
Data confidentiality - - - O 
Tag anonymity - - - O 
Data integrity - O O O 
Reader 
authentication 
- O O O 
DB authentication O O - O 
MitM attack - - - O 
Replay attack - O - O 
Table 3. Comparison among protocols (o: secure, -: insecure) 
From table 3, it can be seen that the proposed protocol meets all security requirements listed 
above. These protocols were primarily designed to provide link security to protect against 
passive and active attacks over the air interface. Due to the limitation of the space, all result 
that been analyzed the vulnerabilities about other protocols, randomized protocol and 
chained hash protocol were described in brief in table 3. 
5.2 The result of verification 
After verifying the protocols using GNY logic, it is confirmed that the proposed protocol 
solves the security weakness in previous hash-based protocols. 
• Secrecy: Spoofing, Replay Attack, Tracking, Eavesdropping on communication between 
tag and reader are attacks that threaten all participants. To protect from these attacks, 
the countermeasures are therefore essentially identical in this protocol as follows. 
Firstly, shifting all data except ID to the backend. This is also to be recommended for 
reasons of data management (i.e. the ID for the tag existing at the backend database will 
be shifted to protect spoofing and eavesdropping attacks to the tag through the 
database when the reader sends a request).  
Secondly, encoding data transmission: encryption of the data transmission is supported to 
ensure authorized access to the data of concern and to protect replay attacks and tracking.  
• Authentication: When a tag receives a “get challenge(query)” command from a reader, 
it generates a random number Tn and sends this number to the reader. The reader in 
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turn generates a random number Rn with it and the random number Tn generates an 
encrypted data block (token T) on the basis of an encryption algorithm and server key 
(R). The data block is then returned to the database to authenticate the reader. The 
reader and tag both use the same encryption algorithm and since the server key is 
stored on the tag, the tag is capable of decrypting the server key(T). If the original 
random number Tn and the random number Tn, which has now been decrypted, are 
identical, then the authenticity of the tag vis-a-vis the reader is demonstrated. 
5.3 The comparison of availability 
In this paper, we propose the strong symmetric key algorithm based RFID authentication 
protocol. Regarding performance of protocol in application level, our assumption is that 
CPUs are now faster and memory and network speeds have also increased, but not nearly as 
much as CPU speeds. Pure computation, such as is used in a block cipher, is cheaper in both 
absolute terms and relative to other tasks, such as writing the data to disc. Unlike DES, 
nearly all of the AES candidates are designed for high performance in software. 
It could be argued that for most applications, nearly all the AES algorithms are fast enough. 
Some literature(Roe, 2000) reached the point where cryptography is not a significant portion 
of the total CPU burden, and the relative speed of the algorithms no longer matters very 
much. Therefore, our proposed protocol can be available for light-weight tags in the RFID 
system. 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
Home network is defined as environments where users can receive home network services 
for anytime and anywhere access through any device, connected with a wired and wireless 
network to home information appliances including the PC. In this environment, there are 
many security threats that violate user privacy and interfere with home services. Especially, 
the home network consists of several networks with RFID system therefore authentication 
between the reader and the appliance devices affixed tag is required. 
In this paper, the RFID security requirements in home network environments are defined, 
and authentication mechanism among reader, tag and database is proposed. The focus is to 
analyze the vulnerabilities of the protocol using formal methods and to design and verify 
the secure authentication protocols, which is widely researched in RFID systems. In 
verifying these protocols using GNY logic, it is possible to confirm some of the known 
security vulnerabilities likely to occur in RFID systems. 
 Finally, a strong authentication protocol based encryption algorithm, is proposed for 
guarding against man-in-the-middle, and replay attacks, and also for verifying safety using 
GNY logic. 
7. Appendix. GNY logical postulates 
In this appendix we list the logical postulates of GNY logic used throughout this paper. 
 
T 1 :  P ◁ *X 
          P ◁ X  
If a principal is told a formula is marked with a not-originated-here asterisk, then the 
principal is told that formula. 
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T2 : P ◁ (X, Y) 
           P ◁ X 
 
Being told a formula implies being told each of its concatenated components. 
 
T3 : P ◁ {X}K, P ∋ K 
                P ◁ X 
 
If a principal is told that he possesses a formula encrypted with a key, then he is considered 
to have been told the decrypted contents of that formula. 
 
P1:  P ◁ X 
        P ∋ X 
 
A principal is capable of possessing anything he is told. 
 
F1 :               P |≡ #(X)            
      P |≡ #(X, Y), P |≡ #(F(X)). 
 
If a principal believes that a formula X is fresh, then it is believed that any formula of which 
X is a component is fresh and that a computationally feasible one-to-one function, F, of X is 
fresh. 
 
R1 :          P |≡ φ (X)          
      P |≡ φ (X, Y), P |≡ φ (F(X)). 
 
If a principal believes that a formula X is recognizable, then it is believed that any formula of 
which X is a component is recognizable and that a computationally feasible one-to-one 
function, F , of X is recognizable. 
 
I4 : P◁ {X}K-, P ∋ K+, P |≡ K+ Q, P |≡ φ (X), P |≡ #(X, K+) 
                      P |≡ Q |~ X, P |≡ Q |~ {X}K-. 
 
If, for principal P, the following conditions hold: P receives a formula X encrypted under 
private key (K-), P possesses the corresponding public key (K+), believes the public key 
belongs to Q, and P believes that the formula X is recognizable that either X or K+ is fresh. 
Then, P believes that Q once conveyed the message X, and that Q once conveyed the 
message X encrypted under Q’s private key   (K-). 
 
J2 : P |≡ Q |⇒ Q |≡ *, P |≡ Q |~(X~>C), P |≡ #(X) 
                               P |≡ Q |≡ C 
 
If principal P believes that Q is honest and competent and P receives a fresh message X with 
the extension C, which he believes Q conveyed, then P believes that Q believes C.  
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